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Abstract This article is about analysing two issues of pornography and hate speech in the context of political theory and Malaysian 
politics. This article examines both issues from liberals arguments and it shows that although liberalism supports the right for free speech, 
since the 1970s many liberals feel that pornography and hate speech should not be part of free speech doctrine because both are not 
contributing for the public good in democratic system and they are also detrimental to the society. By using the cultural arguments of 
Asian values, Malaysia totally rejects these practices because they are not suitable in a cultural and religious conscious Malaysian 
multiracial society. Although many are sceptic about the use of Asian values for the rejection and the uses of hate speech by people 
including the government, opposition and NGOs for political gain, in principle, Malaysians are in consensus of rejecting both issues for 
the good of society. 
 





These two months, November 2007 and January 2008, have shocked the Malaysian public with 
two high profile events which related to the issues of pornography and hate speech. On the eve 
of New Year, two DVDs were distributed anonymously in several towns such as Muar and Batu 
Pahat in Johor showing Dr. Chua Soi Lek, Malaysian Health Minister, having sex with a young 
woman. On 1 January 2008, Chua admitted that he was the person featured in the sex DVDs. 
He claimed of no involvement in the filming and producing of the DVDs. However, on 2 
January 2008, Chua announced of his resignation from the government including as the Health 
Minister, Member of Parliament for Labis, and Vice President of Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA) (The Star Online, 2008). Although this was a political scandal, distributing the DVDs to 
the public and the pornographic content of it were totally against Malaysian laws such as the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act, Penal Code and Broadcasting Act, and taboo to most of 
Malaysian society who are strong culturally and religiously against this type of misbehave or 
immoral practice. 
 Meanwhile one month earlier, Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF), a coalition of 30 
Hindu non-governmental organisations (NGOs) committed to the preservation of Hindu 
community rights and heritage, has organised a rally turned riot on Sunday, 25 November 2007 
to submit the petition at the British High Commission. The group has led agitations against what 
they see as an “unofficial policy of temple demolition” and concerns about the steady 
encroachment of shariah-based law. They also accused of the United Malays National 
Organisations (UMNO)-led government of maginalised the ethnic Indian and run a policy of 
ethnic cleansing (Chandra Muzaffar, 2007, p. 53). According to Chandra Muzaffar (2007, p. 53), 
the statement about ethnic cleansing is dangerous and utterly a reckless and scurrilous allegation. 
It is a clear example of hate speech which have hurt and angered many Malaysians especially the 
Malays. Chandra argues that if the government pursued a goal as diabolical as ethnic cleansing, 
would the principal language of the Indian Malaysian community, namely Tamil, be a medium of 
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instruction in the government managed national primary school. The illegal temple, which was 
built in private area, was not the only place of worship that was brought down; an illegal surau 
(small Muslim place for worship) was also demolished. In most instances, when temples or other 
places of worship are forced to yield to development projects, alternative sites are made 
available. It is obvious that there is no ethnic cleansing in Malaysia like what was happened in 
Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda, however, the provocative racial hatred statement by 
HINDRAF could be easily used by bigots and troublemakers to justify an attack on the Indian 
community. Many worry about the response by other ethnics toward people or ethnic of the 
people who made the statement. This makes hate speech so dangerous to be permitted in a 
multiethnic country like Malaysia. 
Both cases of pornography and hate speech are the latest edition of several similar or 
slightly similar cases in Malaysia that could tarnish and harm the society. Therefore, the purpose 
of this article is not directly to discuss about those two cases or other cases, but is to analyse 
pornography and hate speech thoroughly from the perspective of political theory especially from 
the view of liberalism. This is because there are split between liberals regarding the protection of 
pornography and hate speech from any restrictions. Some extreme liberals argue that 
pornography and hate speech are two important components of the doctrine of free speech 
which is refuted by the more moderate liberals who believe pornography and hate speech are 
degrading the society. This article will also explore the cultural debate in Malaysia with relation to 
those two issues. This debate examines the cultural argument of Asian values embraced by 
Malaysian society in forbidding the practice of pornography and hate speech, and the rejection of 
Malaysian society toward the concept of unfettered freedom of speech.  
 
2. War Within Liberalism  
 
At its most extreme, liberalism means no control on freedom. Supporters of maximal free speech 
are inclined to claim that a society will be both more stable and freer in the long run if open 
discussion prevails. Rodney A. Smolla (1992, pp. 12-17) argues that if societies are not to be 
undermined by festering tensions, there must be “safety valves” through which the citizens may 
let off steam. Openness fosters resilience; peaceful protest displaces more violence than it 
triggers; free debate dissipates more hate than it stirs. Defining rights as individual and absolute, 
liberals recognise that there will be abuses in the practice of free speech but are willing to pay 
that price rather than have government set the boundaries. They argue that to establish 
permissible limits would ultimately lead to a society unable to decide important question for itself 
and thus easy prey for the demagogue or a manipulative government (Stevens, 1982, p. 14).  
In recent years, according to Owen Fiss (1996, p. 3), liberals have also been at war with 
themselves. For some time, freedom of speech has held them together, but now it is a source of 
division and conflict. Liberals have divided over the effort to establish a free speech doctrine. 




During the late 1950s and 1960s in the US, the Supreme Court fashioned a constitutional 
definition of “obscenity” in order to place limits on state regulation of sexually explicit material. 
Only books, magazines, and films that met this narrow definition could be proscribed. Fiss 
argues that while conservatives fought for the right of the state to protect traditional sexual 
mores and decried the Supreme Court’s stance, liberals uniformly embraced the effort to curb 
the censorship of pornography and viewed the sexual politics of the late 1960s as an important 
source of personal freedom and moral autonomy. 
The term “moral autonomy”, frequently used by those who defend freedom of speech, is 
heavily influenced by Kantian accounts of autonomy. This argument suggests that people are 
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capable of arriving at their own moral convictions but not at their own theories of physics or 
medicine where they must rely on the opinions of experts. It is assumed that the wish to restrict 
speech comes from a desire to prevent moral harm (Brison, 1998, p. 323). Ronald Dworkin 
(1985), in his defence of the right to pornography, appeals to a right to autonomy which he 
terms as a “right to moral independence”. He writes:  
 
People have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social 
goods and opportunities, including disadvantage in the liberties permitted to 
them by the criminal law, just on the ground that their officials or fellow-citizens 
think that their opinions about the right way for them to lead their own lives are 
ignoble or wrong. I shall call this…the right to moral independence…if someone 
has a right to moral independence, this means that it is…wrong for officials to 
act in violation of that right, even if they (correctly) believe that the community 
as a whole would be better off if they did. (Dworkin, 1985, pp. 353-372) 
 
Dworkin holds the view that to restrict people’s speech or to restrict their access to other’s 
speech out of contempt for their way of life or their view of the good is a violation of their right 
to moral independence or autonomy. In agreement with Dworkin, David Richards asserts, in an 
article defending the right to pornography, that freedom of speech “supports a mature 
individual’s sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with others…In so doing, it 
nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person. Further, freedom of expression 
protects the interest of the mature individual, with developed capacities of rational choice, in 
deciding whether to be an audience to a communication and in weighing the communication 
according to his own rational vision of life…The value of free speech, in this view, rests on its 
deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination without which the life 
of the spirit is meagre and slavish.” (Richards, 1974, pp. 45-91) 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, feminists – long a vital component of 
the liberal coalition – launched a new campaign against pornography, and as a result this area of 
the law became another contested domain of liberalism. The new campaign against pornography 
differed from those of the past in that the proposed regulation was intended not to preserve 
traditional mores concerning sexuality but rather to enhance equality for women. A number of 
the leaders of the feminist movement, for example Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, 
claimed that pornography eroticises the domination of women and transforms women into 
sexual objects to be used by men and thus is partially responsible for their subordination in 
domains both private and public (Fiss, 1996, p. 3). Although autonomy theorists are generally 
opposed to restrictions on pornography, it is plausible to argue that such speech succeeds in 
presenting harmful actions, such as rape, in a favourable light in ways that bypass an individual’s 
deliberative or cognitive capacities. Pornography can provoke our deepest and unarticulated 
prejudices and we can find ourselves aroused by pornographic representations, without having 
fully contemplated the meaning of such representations. MacKinnon (1987, p. 164) even claims 
that pornography should be understood as part of a practice of sex discrimination, and therefore 
deserves no legal protection because it is incompatible with gender equality. Laws to control 
speech that affect people in these ways would not violate people’s autonomy because, the claim 
is, the influence they have is not rationally mediated. Hence, if autonomy theorists want to 
defend the protection of pornography, they will have to appeal to something other than people’s 
autonomy (Dwyer, 2001, pp. 1-18). 
 
4. Hate Speech 
 
Besides, a similar concern about the impact that public utterances may have upon the social 
status of disadvantaged groups has recently led to a revival of interest in regulation of hate 
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speech, though the psychological dynamic by which that speech inflicts its harm differs from that 
of pornography and the group allegedly victimised is not primarily women but racial and 
religious minorities. As with pornography, the question posed is whether the regulation of hate 
speech is consistent with, or even required by, an acceptable liberal principle of freedom of 
speech. On this issue, liberals once again find themselves drawn into sharp combat. 
Hate speech can be defined as insults and characterisations that are directed against an 
individual’s or a group’s race, religion, ethnic origin, or gender, which may incite violence, hatred 
or discrimination (Rud and Sexton, 1999, p. 1). In the United States (US), hate speech is a broad 
term that may include a great variety of expression, but according to Nelson v. Streeter 1994, it 
generally refers to words or symbols that are “offensive, hurtful, and wounding” and are directed 
at racial or ethnic characteristics, gender, religious affiliation, or sexual preference (Trager and 
Dickerson, 1999, p. 124). The US courts usually consider hate speech part of the “rough and 
tumble” of discourse that is part of a democratic and open society. On the contrary, some 
contend that hate speech is deliberately hurtful, morally no better than physical aggression, and 
should not be permitted in civilised societies. Hate speech is a form of speech that goes to the 
core issues in society, for example, racism, homophobia, and women’s rights. In many countries 
including Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, as well as Malaysia, it is not protected. 
In the past ten years, too, there has been a movement in the US to have hate speech removed 
from its place at the core of protected speech, arguing that it is dangerous and damages 
individuals and society. Many support the view that hate speech may be legitimately restricted 
because it is not essential to democracy and indeed, it often undermines the equal respect that is 
essential to democracy as well as causing other social harms. For instance, it encourages feelings 
of inferiority, destroys self-esteem as well as personal security and emotion (Matsuda et al., 1993). 
Thus, a number of minority and female writers argue that the US approach to hate speech is 
inadequate and that it should be subject to criminal or civil penalties3.  
Several theorists criticise the proposal to restrict hate speech, primarily for two reasons. 
First, there is an idea that speech should be allowed and tested by the people without restriction. 
One leading supporter of this idea is Henry Louis Gates (1993, pp. 37-38), who decries the effort 
of critical ethnic theorists who support the punishment of those who engage in hate speech. He 
claims that the theory behind hate speech codes – if you banish the speech, you banish the hate 
– is not only simplistic but also unrealistic. Equality, justice, and human dignity, if allowed to 
remain unchallenged and untested by racists and bigots of every stripe, will not prosper but 
become Mill’s “dead dogma”. Gates says that American hate speech codes, which target vulgar 
language and epithets, do nothing to halt carefully worded bigotry4. Gerald Gunter (1994, p. 76) 
agrees with Gates and argues that opinion expressed in debates and arguments about a wide rage 
of political and social issues should not be suppressed simply because of disagreement with the 
content or form of the expression. He stresses that speech should not and cannot be banned 
simply because it is “offensive” to substantial parts of, or a majority of, a community. The 
proper answer to bad speech is usually more and better speech – not new laws, litigation and 
repression5. 
Second, there is also an argument that the restriction of hate speech will harm the 
democratic system and public discourse. Robert Post (1991, pp. 267-328) argues that the banning 
of hate speech would sacrifice other important values served by the freedom of speech such as 
exchange of ideas and open debate. Democracy serves the value of self-determination by 
establishing a communicative structure within which the varying perspectives of individuals can 
be reconciled through reason. If the state were to forbid the expression of particular ideas, the 
government would become, with respect to individuals holding those ideas, suppressive and 
non-democratic. Although Post argues that all opinions should be tolerated so long as their 
protagonists urge their acceptance by legal methods, the notion that racist ideas ought to be 
forbidden within public discourse because of the offensiveness is thus fundamentally 
irreconcilable with the rationale for freedom of speech. He thinks that the case has not yet been 
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made for circumscribing public discourse to prevent the kind of pre-emptive silencing that 
occurs when members of victim groups experience “fear, rage, (and) shock”. If the empirical 
claim of systematic pre-emptive silencing is accepted, in his view, it is directly the result of the 
social and structural conditions of racism, rather than of specifically racist speech. This is the 
logic of the argument from pre-emptive silencing does not impeach the necessity of preserving 
the free speech of ideas, public discourse could at most be regulated in a largely symbolic manner 
so as to purge it of outrageous racist epithets and names. Post concludes that it is highly 
implausible to claim that such symbolic regulation will eliminate the pre-emptive silencing that is 
said to justify restraints on public discourse, and deliberative self-government is not compatible 
with such restriction on free speech (Arthur, 1997, pp. 231-232). 
 However, the arguments of Gates, Gunter and Post for allowing the expression of hate 
speech are rather dangerous. Joel Feinberg (1984) argues that when fighting words are used to 
provoke people who are legally prevented from using a fighting response, the offence is 
profound enough to allow for prohibition. However, Feinberg also suggests that a variety of 
factors need to be taken into account when deciding whether speech can be limited by the 
offence principle. These include the extent, duration and social value of the speech, the ease with 
which it can be avoided, the motives of the speaker, the number of people offended, the 
intensity of the offence, and the general interest of the community at large. In a multicultural and 
multiracial society where the risk of violence and disorder is real and can undermine the nation’s 
political stability, the restriction of hate speech should be allowed. Speech influences action and 
hate speech can spark aggression and violent behaviour. A society that wants to encourage 
tolerance between races and ethnic groups must choose a policy that creates political stability and 
not one that promotes enmity, and hostility even in the name of marketplace of ideas. The idea 
of associating hate speech with democracy and self-government is also unconvincing, as a 
democratic political system can still flourish in the absence of hate speech. This is clear from the 
numerous democracies where hate speech is restricted. 
Public hate speech can be argued to violate the rights of some members of the 
community itself. As we have seen, political discourse is often understood on Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s (1965) model of the town meeting. Free speech is essential to reach informed 
decisions on matters of common concern. At the same time, Meiklejohn stresses that speakers 
can be required to observe certain rules of order. These rules do not violate freedom of speech, 
but rather make free deliberation possible. In particular, he observes that if a speaker is abusive 
or in other ways threatens to defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may be and should be 
declared out of order. It would seem to follow from this view that public hate speech should not 
be protected under the constitution. Like abusive speech in a town meeting, hate speech violates 
the integrity of the deliberative process by undermining the possibility of reasoned discourse. As 
Meiklejohn observes, such discourse cannot take place except on the basis of mutual respect 
among citizens who regard one another as capable of engaging in rational self-government. Of 
course, public debate in a large modern society differs in many ways from Meiklejohn’s town 
meeting, and a great deal of speech that would be improper in that setting is considered 
acceptable within the polity at large. However, Meiklejohn’s basic insight is valid. Democratic 
self-government is impossible in the absence of a minimal degree of civility and mutual respect 
among citizens. Although that minimum standard will differ depending on the nature, size, 
customs, and values of each society, its members must observe some standard or they cease to 
constitute a democratic community. Thus, however minimal our society’s version of that 
standard is taken to be, it will be violated by speech that denies recognition to others on the basis 
of race, ethnicity, gender, or religion (Heyman, 1999, pp. 1380-1383). 
 
5.  Malaysia’s Cultural Arguments: The Asian Values 
 
The theory and practice of human rights has emerged in the context of particular social, 
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economic, cultural and political conditions. The circumstances that prompted the 
institutionalisation of human rights in the West do not exist in Asia, but it would be a mistake to 
assume that nothing of theoretical significance has emerged from Asia. The debate on Asian 
values has prompted critical intellectuals in the region to reflect on how they can locate 
themselves in a debate on human rights and democracy in which they had not previously played 
a substantial part. Neither wholly rejecting nor wholly endorsing the values and practices 
ordinarily realised through a liberal democratic political regime, these intellectuals are drawing on 
their own cultural traditions and exploring areas of commonality and difference with the West. 
Though often less provocative than the views of their governments, in the sense that few argue 
for the wholesale rejection of Western-style liberal democracy, these unofficial Asian viewpoints 
may offer more considered and less politically motivated contributions to the debate.  
As an advocate of “Asian values”, Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, explains that the Malaysian perspective of “Asian values” is based on Malay-Islamic 
culture and should be protected against absorption by Western values. He urges the three most 
basic elements of “Malayness” – feudalism, Islam, and adat (traditional customs) as he saw it in 
1970 in his book, The Malay Dilemma, should all be classed as features to be merely accepted as 
realities and perhaps adapted to modern needs (Barr, 2002, p. 42). Mahathir (Mahathir and 
Ishihara, 1995, pp. 71-86) rejects the Western liberal notion of unfettered free speech which, he 
believes, can corrupt Malaysian culture and religious beliefs. Concerned about the influence of 
Western individualism, and the future of Asian values and traditions, Mahathir launched the 
“Look East” policy in 1982 as a broader campaign against “Western values”. Mahathir told the 
1982 UMNO General Assembly to “Look East” to emulate the diligence found there and “to rid 
ourselves of the Western values that we have absorbed” (Khoo, 1995, p. 69). 
It has been argued that although the Malays are facing rapid development and 
modernisation, especially under Mahathir’s, and his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s 
leaderships, they are still embracing and prioritising certain values. The Malay values of patience, 
respect and togetherness are applied through people’s tactful actions in everyday social 
interactions, but more importantly, they are also achieved through linguistic indirectness, hedges 
and other “positive politeness strategies”. According to Lim Beng Soon, by avoiding 
disagreements, criticisms, complaints and any other face-threatening acts (FTAs) that might 
reduce the desirability of the addressee and using hedges or even white lies to avoid conflicts, 
one shows forbearance, achieves harmony and demonstrates togetherness, thus meeting the 
essential requirement of Malay etiquette (Yuan, 2003, p. 1). For example, people are warned to 
guard against speaking in a direct manner as it may lead to serious consequences: “berapa tajam 
pisau parang, tajam lagi lidah manusia” – “knives and machetes are not as sharp as tongues”. Malay 
culture has significant implications for negotiation processes and outcomes. In negotiation, the 
Malays’ compromising and obliging conflict-handling styles are probably manifestations of their 
collective nature, which prioritises group over personal interests. In compromising and obliging 
styles, negotiators are more concerned with maintaining relationship and safeguarding their 
partner’s feeling, hence the seemingly perceived “weak-styles” in goal-oriented negotiation. To 
the Malays, even though achieving their goals in a negotiation is important, their values in 
preserving harmony and respect for elders take precedence in the negotiation process (Lailawati, 
2005, p. 8). 
Religion is an integral component of cultural values, although in Southeast Asia its 
influence is similarly contested. Ismail Ibrahim (2001) admits that as long as Asian values or 
other values are not contradicted by Islamic teachings and values, those values should be 
accepted in Malaysian society, e.g. respect to elderly people and good work ethics. He also 
stresses that all societies have their own measurements of human rights, which are based on local 
values, religious practices and traditions. Freedom of speech should be used in as appropriate a 
manner as possible without undermining sensitive issues such as national security, religious 
beliefs and multiracial harmony. Some Southeast Asian leaders have argued that the aggressive 
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separation of church and state in the West – in effect limiting religion to the private sphere – and 
the consequent process of secularisation have contributed to a moral void in public life and 
accentuated the negative impulses of individualism (Inoguchi and Newman, 1997, p. 1-9). In 
Malaysia, despite the obvious diversity of religions – chiefly Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and 
Christianity – and a similar process of secularisation, it has been argued that religion still plays an 
important part in everyday life and contributes to group identity and orientation. In fact, 
according to Joseph Lo, most East and Southeast Asians would prefer some constraints of free 
speech, perhaps in the form of libel laws to protect cultures from various forms of defamation 
and hate speech (Bell, 2000, p. 9). 
However, many writers criticise the argument of “Asian values” from the context of 
culture. Wan A. Manan (1999, p. 359-381) thinks that the discourse on “Asian values” is basically 
a cultural construction aimed at maintaining certain practices that came under threat from 
globalisation and democratisation. Underlying current global transformations are forces that tend 
to generate fundamental changes within society. These include issues relating to human rights, 
civil society, gender consciousness and democratic reforms. However, the cultural position that 
advocates the division between the “West” and “East” is misleading because these are not two 
big permanent static blocks. The dynamic relationships between cultures in the age of global 
interactions keep them in a constant state of flux. In any case, proponents of “Asian values” are 
not alone in their cultural claim because Western scholars such as Huntington consider their 
version of democracy and human rights as the only valid and objective one (Huntington, 1993, p. 
22).  
The most disturbing use, or rather abuse, of the cultural argument is that it is often a 
central plank in the narrative of those governments who actively oppose the application of 
international human rights standards in their countries in order to buttress their own power. The 
presumed “tolerance” and “pluralism” of culture seems to underwrite a conservative political 
agenda: the tolerance and perhaps even maintenance of highly not egalitarian and repressive 
political systems, while ironically energies are devoted to the “sentimental education” of ruthless 
and cruel dictators (e.g., Suharto of Indonesia and Marcos of the Philippine) and the 
predominantly illiterate and subjugated masses of this world. Cultural particularism is often “one 
of the most useful ideologies” in mounting a defence and bringing about international 
acquiescence in state repression (Wilson, 1997, p. 9).  
The concept of human rights, therefore, relates to the dignity of the human individual. 
Some critics think that this philosophy is misunderstood by some Asian political leaders, who 
conflate the anti-social behaviour of some individuals in the West with the individualism of the 
theory of human rights (Fareed, 1994, p. 111). A common source of this misunderstanding is the 
relationship between rights and duties. It is said that “Asian” morality is based on duties, while 
“Western” morality is based on rights (Ghai, 1995, p. 60). Michael Freeman (1996, p. 361) argues 
that this misstates the logic of rights. He explains that Locke (1689/1993), for example, held that 
everyone has the duty to respect the life and dignity of others. Rational individuals consent to 
live under government on condition that it also implements the same duties. Governments that 
violate the rights of their citizens deserve condemnation as tyrannies. So, similarly, societies that 
impose imperial rule over other peoples without their consent are guilty of violating the rights of 
those people. The concept of human rights justifies democracy and condemns tyranny and 
imperialism.  
In any case, there are no grounds for believing that norms originating in one place should 
be inherently unsuitable for solving problems more generally. Such a belief commits the “genetic 
fallacy”, in that it assumes that a norm is suitable only to the culture of its origin. However, the 
origin of an idea in one culture does not entail its unsuitability to another culture. If, for example, 
there are good reasons for protecting the free speech of Asian people, free speech should be 
respected, no matter whether the idea of free speech originated in the West or Asia, or how long 
it has had currency. In fact, Asian countries may have now entered into historical circumstances 
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where the affirmation and protection of free speech is not only possible but also desirable 
(Xiaorong, 2001, pp. 42-43). Therefore, some of the criticisms of the “Asian values” position 
carry the further implication that the stress on “Asian culture” is found only at the elite, 
leadership level. The wider population in Malaysia, Singapore and the other countries of Asia, it 
seems to be suggested, hold values that are not radically different from those usually associated 
with liberal democracy (Kahn, 1989, pp. 5-29).  
In response to the criticism, many writers argue that culture, indeed, plays a significant 
role in everyday life of Asian society. Despite these question marks over the practice of cultural 
analysis, however, a number of recent studies underline the danger of dismissing entirely the role 
of different cultural perspectives in analysing processes of change and interaction within the 
Asian region. In a survey analysis, Joel Kahn (1997, pp. 29-30) has reported on one hundred and 
twenty interviews with “middle class Malays” he carried out from 1992-1994. He “found that 
almost all respondents articulated some form of the Asian values argument”. They stressed 
concerns about the “threat posed to Malay culture by modernisation” and criticised the West for 
its “lack of family values, individualism and selfishness, a lack of cultural values, permissiveness, 
secularisation and uncaring”. Although the phrase “Asian values” possesses real inadequacies as 
a descriptive expression, it also argues that we cannot proceed from this point to the further 
assumption that there is no need to examine the substantial range of cultural perspectives and 
values which influence behaviour within and between Asian societies. Mahathir and Lee Kuan 
Yew, of course, are well aware of the political usefulness of “Asian values”, but the evidence 
clearly demonstrates that these Southeast Asian leaders do not by any means construct their 
ideological packages in a cultural vacuum. 
  
6. Freedom of Speech is not Absolute: There is no Such Thing as Pornography and Hate      
    Speech in Malaysia 
 
Regarding the issue of free speech, I am persuaded by Li-ann Thio (1999, pp. 1-86) who argues 
that a distinction should be drawn between contested human rights norms and those norms 
upon which all agree, such as the right to free speech. The controversy surrounding the latter 
category is one with respect to the scope of application, not the substance of the value. The right 
of free speech, which underpins a democratic society, is, for example, formally guaranteed in the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution and as well as the US Bill of Rights. The controversy concerns 
the degree of liberty that should be permitted and the permissible grounds for derogation. This 
can have extensive ramifications in the practical realm, as illustrated by the following quote from 
a scholar, Shad Faruqi:  
 
Admittedly, the rugged individualism, un-inhibitedness and licentiousness of what is still 
“the wild, wild West” is contrary to Asian tradition. Our attitudes to nation, religion and 
culture, race, family and community are reverential. We draw a line between liberty and 
license. We do not deem it a matter of constitutional principle that there should be a 
right to desecrate our national flag, to blaspheme our religions and to walk freely into 
shops to buy murderous weapons. We view a free-wheeling sexual lifestyle, drug taking 
and alcohol addiction with revulsion. With the bulk of us, pornography is not part of 
free speech, abortion on demand is not part of personal liberty and homosexuality is not 
part of freedom of choice. We acknowledge that rights and responsibilities must go 
hand-in-hand and that freedom is not an end in itself. (Shad, 1996, p. 17) 
 
Joseph Chan (2000, pp. 59-74) has identified approaches – which he calls “thin” accounts of 
human rights – as a cause of the disjunction between Western liberalism and the social 
conservatism of the “Asian values” discourse. He regards such declaratory accounts of human 
rights as nothing more than “shorthand” for the results of bundles of sophisticated and 
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contingent arguments. The right to freedom of speech, for instance, is a shorthand that describes 
several different rights, each with its own rationale; the rights to commercial speech, political 
speech, artistic expression, and religious expression. Shorthand can be useful for facilitating 
discussion and for coining a slogan, but the slogan should never be mistaken for the argument. 
Hence Chan argues that:  
 
 …the general right to freedom of speech as such is a generalisation from these 
independently justified specific rights. Thus to decide whether cigarette 
advertising should be regulated, it requires substantive reasoning from square one 
– we need to discuss what sorts of interests and what parties are relevant and 
how those interests should be balanced. (Chan, 2000, p. 65) 
 
The same caveats apply to the application of the “freedom of speech” mantra to pornography, 
expressions of racial hatred, and sexist language, not to mention issues to which we barely give 
second thought, such as a child’s “freedom of speech” vis-à-vis a parent’s or teacher’s authority. 
It is because we have mistaken imprecise shorthand generalisations for the real thing that so 
many supposedly fundamental and universal human rights commonly conflict with other 
fundamental and universal human rights (Barr, 2002, pp. 188-189). For example, consider the 
right to freedom of speech in the case of pornography. Pornography has been more heavily 
censored in some Asian countries, e.g. Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, than in most Western 
ones. Does the prohibition of pornography unjustifiably violate freedom of speech? Adopting 
the three-party analysis of interests mentioned above, some may judge that what is required is a 
balancing of the interests of the publishers (commercial and ideological interests), the 
audience/consumers’ interests (in erotic excitement) and third-party, or community, interests. 
Important disagreements may centre on the third-party interests, some may take the view that 
the community as a whole has an interest in maintaining its moral standards, and that society’s 
morals should, therefore, enter into our judgements. However, this view offends many liberals 
who uphold a particular mid-level principle, namely, that it is not the business of the state to 
enforce a society’s particular moral ethos. On this view, the maintenance of morals is never a 
legitimate interest to enter into the balancing calculus. According to Chan (2000, pp. 70-72), 
those accepting the legitimacy of, for example, the principle of legal moralism would allow 
society’s morals to be put on the scale; those liberals who are against legal moralism would not. 
In Malaysia, moralism is parallel with the cultural and religious (Islamic) practices and normally, 
principles of political morality guide Malaysian society to make this kind of fundamental 
decision, such as banning pornography. The government has an essential role to represent 
society’s moralism and act on cultural value and religious belief. 
There is strong consensus amongst Malaysians whether they are Malays (or other 
indigenous tribes), Chinese, or Indians, which rejects materials of a pornographic or sexual 
nature as immoral and obscene. Pornography is seen as a kind of exploitation as it degrades, 
endangers, and harms the lives of women. Although many in the business argue that the 
women’s involvement in pornography is voluntary, many Malaysians believe that there is an 
element of exploitation by the pornographic industry. Mahathir argues in this context:  
 
 …there are limits to freedom, and I believe it is important for every member of a society 
to know these limits. One good example is pornography. You can have computer 
animation, which may be ever so creative – and thus should be freely available – but if 
this “freedom” is used to produce pornographic films that are purveyed to the 
impressionable young, then the fruits of the freedom should not be accepted and 
allowed by society. In Malaysia, it is not my impression that business ingenuity or 
creativity have been stifled by our Malaysian value system which sets clear limits to 
individual freedom and generally emphasises the community over the individual. To the 
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contrary, I believe that our value system has been the foundation for our society’s 
stability and prosperity, at least until the economic crisis struck. (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 73-
74) 
 
On this matter, the government takes the initiative to protect public morality and the traditional 
way of life from pornography and sexual exploitation. For instance, in February 2002, the 
government banned a rerun of the controversial feminist play The Vagina Monologues. The play, 
presented by local performers, and according to the producer of the show, the play contained 
adult material but was neither vulgar nor obscene. The play was banned because of alleged 
complaints by members of the public on the vulgar content and title of the play. 
Mahathir also attacked Western liberal democracy which often tolerates offensive and hate 
speech:  
 
 Malaysian democracy is not a liberal democracy and not bound to accept every new 
interpretation of democracy in the West where democratic fanatics have pushed 
devotion to a pedantic notion of democracy to include the protection of neo-fascists or 
the empowering of a vocal minority of political activists over the silent majority of 
ordinary citizens. (Leigh and Lip, 2004, p. 320) 
 
Mahathir’s successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in his first speech to the Parliament on assuming 
his appointment as the Prime Minister in November 2003, expressed his conviction that 
democracy is the best system of governance, but:  
 
 Democracy does not mean absolute freedom. Issues that inflame religious, racial 
(ethnic), and cultural sentiments should not be sensationalised, while attempts to 
undermine national security must be dealt with firmly. (SUARAM, 2004, p. 21) 
 
Abdullah will pledge to ensure ethnic harmony and stability, and continue restricting hate speech 
that is deemed to be a threat to national security and public order. 
Furthermore, K.J. Ratnam (2003, pp. 34-35) rejects the liberal argument that every time a regime 
embarks on actions that curtail political freedoms it does so without legitimate cause and only for 
self-interested reasons, or that opponents of governments are themselves always believers in 
democracy and civil rights. He argues that the importance of social and political stability, 
especially in multiracial society, is strong enough to justify substantial restrictions on hate speech. 
With regard to the media, Ratnam (2003, pp. 54-55) urges that editors should disallow the 
publication of views that inflame ethnic feelings or in other ways undermine the fabric of society, 
even though the reasons for publishing those views are to honour their commitment to freedom 
of speech and their opposition to censorship. He concurs with the decision by the editor of a 
major Malaysian newspaper not to published letters, reports or articles that incite people to racial 
hatred. 
However, we also have to beware of the government’s leaders, members and supporters 
who use hate speech in strengthening their grip in power and exploiting ethnic issues for political 
purposes. Sumit K. Mandal (2004, p. 57), for instance, realises this and criticises the Malaysian 
government’s policy on racial hatred, arguing that racialised, and even racist, instruments of state 
and politics find their place in the public spaces of Malaysia without much sustained and rigorous 
criticism. Notable examples of racialised language are the primordialist terms “Malay supremacy” 
(ketuanan Melayu) and “newcomer” or “immigrant” (pendatang) used by chauvinist elements in the 
Malay leadership to assert an inherent difference between their “own” and “migrant” others. In 
recent decades, according to Mandal, these chauvinist terms have come to the fore during elite 
political crises in order to galvanise groups along racial lines. Hence, when oppositional groups, 
including NGOs, accuse the state of racist politics, their arguments often run aground and do 
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not find widespread support. The racialisation of state initiatives like the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) soon after the watershed of 13 May 1969, have institutionalised race and made it part of 
an effective political system, thus furthering its unproblematised existence. As a result, according 
to Mandal, the state may be credited with making colonial era racialisation, with a policy of 
divide and rule, a post-colonial success. 
Anwar Ibrahim also made a same argument and accused the government of appealing to 
puritanical Muslim sentiment to reinforce support ahead of the vote in the next 12th general 
election. Commentators in multiracial but Muslim majority Malaysia have sounded alarm over 
the growing “Islamisation” of the country and the increasing polarisation of the three main 
ethnic communities. Anwar, speaking in the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ Regional 
Outlook Forum, argued that Malaysia’s problem is not radicalism but the issue of state-
sponsored Muslim Puritanism which is more by racist sentiments than religious principles. 
Anwar said that “for some reason it is the belief of the present administration in Kuala Lumpur 
that playing the puritanical card would be best bet for the UMNO-dominated ruling coalition to 
secure electoral success in the coming election…By holding themselves out to be the staunchest 
defender of Islam, UMNO hope to garner greater support” (Agence France-Press, 2008, p. 1). 
Clearly, hate speech is not only spoken by bigots and racists, but also sometimes by some people 
in power who try to achieve their objective of retaining the political power. They will use any 
mechanism to ensure they get what they want including by using hate speech. Germany’s Nazi in 
the Holocaust during World War II and Rwanda’s Hutu/Tutsi in Genocide in 1990s proofed 
that hate speech could be used to achieve certain racist policy of the government. In Malaysian 
history, the 13th May 1969 racial incident was the obvious example that hate speech had been 
utilised to gain seats and win constituencies for political power.  
Therefore any practices of hate speech should be stopped in order to ensure the real 
racial harmony and political stability exists in Malaysia. Any disagreements or dissatisfactions 
should be resolved in civil as manner possible. Proper peaceful dialogues and discussions could 
be the way in resolving any problems especially with regards to racial issues. In general, 
Malaysians can accept that the restrictions on pornography and hate speech are for the common 
good. No such campaign, either by the government, opposition and NGOs, in legalising the 
pornography and hate speech in Malaysia is a comprehensible proof that Malaysians dislike those 
kind of speeches or expressions. 
  
7.  Conclusions 
 
The liberal argument for free speech is not suitable to be implemented in a multicultural or 
multiracial society if pornography and hate speech are allowed to be practised and state 
intervention in maintaining social order is discouraged for the purpose of defending unfettered 
free speech. Speech such as pornography and hate speech, which certain societies may value as 
important for individual rights and freedom of choice, are not included under special 
constitutional protection, especially in Malaysia, because they are not contributing anything to 
the democratic process and, of course, against cultural values of many societies, thus restricting 
them cannot be seen as a breach of civil liberties or free speech. The constitutional protected 
political speech has value for the community as a whole, beyond its value to the speaker, and 
consequently ought to be specially nurtured. Suppression may be especially justifiable because 
“evil” speech is not just a private wrong to another individual but a public bad that may lead to 
harm to the whole community (Mill, 2002; Baker, 1989, p. 35). 
There are two reasons why the “Asian values” thesis provides a legitimate basis 
restricting freedom of speech particularly pornography and hate speech. These are first, to 
protect cultural identity, and second, to defend national stability. Asian values are the best 
protection for Malaysian culture from the invasion of negative Western culture. “Asian values” 
has been used as shield to prevent Western culture from overwhelming Malaysian culture. 
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Although the Malaysian people do not totally reject all of Western culture and its values, certain 
practices such as pornography and hate speech are unacceptable to the Malaysian multiracial 
society. These practices are also unacceptable in the sense that they conflict with the dominant 
cultural and religious beliefs of Malaysian peoples. Although, many are sceptic about the 
government intention of promoting Asian values, the use of cultural values in containing 
pornography and hate speech should be encouraged in order to promote public good in the 
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